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Resumen: 
La mayoría de los filósofos reconocen que hay casos en los que individuos 
particulares tienen que estar agradecidos con aquel que les haya benefi-
ciado de forma que tengan razones para tratarlo de forma diferenciada. 
De igual manera, argumento, hay casos en los que es la sociedad como 
tal la beneficiada por la conducta de un individuo de forma que se genera 
una obligación colectiva de gratitud que debe expresarse a nivel político 
y socioeconómico. La preocupación política por  el mérito no debería ser 
meramente instrumental, sino también moral: una sociedad no puede ser 
justa si ignora sus obligaciones colectivas de gratitud. Critico el famoso ar-
gumento de la lotería natural de Rawls mostrando que depende de  una 
concepción problemática de  la responsabilidad moral y desarrollo algunas 
consideraciones en torno al papel  que la gratitud debe desempeñar en el 
diseño de instituciones y políticas públicas.
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Abstract: 
Most philosophers recognize that sometimes particular individuals have to 
be grateful to others who have benefited them in a way that provides rea-
sons for treating them in a differential way. In the same way, I argue, there 
are cases in which society as such benefits from the actions of a person, 
which gives rise to collective duties of gratitude that must be expressed at 
the political and socio-economic levels. The political concern about merit 
should not be merely instrumental, but also moral: a society cannot be just 
if it disregards its collective duties of gratitude. I criticize Rawls’ famous 
Natural Lottery Argument showing that it relies on a problematic unders-
1 [Recibido: 2016-10-04 Aceptado en su versión final: 2017-01-02.]
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tanding of the notion of moral responsibility and develop some conside-
rations on the role that gratitude should play when designing both public 
institutions and policies. 
Key Words: Gratitude; Distributive justice; Natural Lottery; Meritocracy.
Introduction
Many times the fact that someone has benefited us is a strong reason for 
treating them differently. There are plenty of available cases that show 
the relevance of gratitude when it comes to interpersonal relations- such 
as face-to-face interactions and small social institutions such as the fa-
mily, the workplace and so on- and most of philosophers have accepted 
that sometimes we do have duties of gratitude that arise from other peo-
ple benefiting us. The question I would like to address here is whether 
gratitude should also play a role in public institutions and policy-ma-
king. Whether justice requires that we shape our public institutions in 
such a way that they respond to the gratitude the community owes to 
those who most significantly contribute to our common goals.
Traditionally most political theorists have agreed that gratitude 
should not be confined to the private realm of interpersonal rela-
tions. Instead, they thought that it should also play a key role when 
designing political institution and shaping collective agency. There 
is a long tradition that goes back to Plato and Aristotle according to 
which justice requires that people are treated differently according to 
their contributions to society.  Even Marxism, with its emphasis on 
the undeserved privileges of capital owners retakes a moral intuition 
in favor of praising merit through social and political means. As far 
as I can tell, for most of the history of Western thought this has being 
a shared idea among almost the entire political spectrum.
Nevertheless, there has been an important change on how phi-
losophers and political thinkers conceive gratitude in politics since 
the 1970´s. These days there is a significant consensus on the oppo-
site side; that we should never extrapolate the concept of gratitude 
we have in our interpersonal relations (which they still subscribe) to 
the political realm. Rawls is responsible for this turn, thanks to an 
argument (The Natural Lottery Argument) that has been accepted 
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by most contemporary philosophers.2 I will try to show that his argu-
ment is not plausible at all, and that we should start thinking about 
a political theory that has a place for gratitude and merit, as we had 
been doing since Plato and Aristotle. It is an important aspect of po-
litical morality that we should never have forgotten.
Since duties of gratitude arise when people do meritorious things, 
there is a strong conceptual connection between caring about gra-
titude and implementing meritocratic principles for social arrange-
ments. As I will argue, our communitarian duties of gratitude de-
mand some meritocratic policies and institutions. “Meritocracy” is a 
vague notion, and there is an important sense- related to efficiency- 
in which it has not been abandoned by Rawlsians. Here I am concer-
ned with defending only one side of it, the one that is directly deri-
ved from the duties of gratitude. That there is something inherently 
good – that is, regardless of its good consequences- in distributing 
in accordance with merit. If this is so, then some non-instrumental 
formulation of the Meritocratic Principle has to be accepted.
I merely want to point out that rewarding meritorious people, and 
therefore introducing meritocratic considerations, should be an im-
portant element in any satisfactory political theory. There are rea-
sons based on merits that can sometimes ground social inequalities, 
and thus, a fully egalitarian scenario is not morally desirable. If I am 
right then radical egalitarian societies cannot be just, as there are 
some forms of inequalities that have moral worth.
Unfortunately I cannot develop here a complete theory that weighs 
these considerations with others, although I give some basic remarks 
I take to be relevant for this task. I also leave aside what specific ins-
titutions and policies are required for fulfilling these principles. This 
is so because the effectiveness of different institutional and political 
strategies depends on the socioeconomic and historical circumstan-
ces, which require a case by case analysis of the available alternati-
ves. There are many times in which the best way for a society to fulfil 
its duties of gratitude is not through direct government intervention 
but through the encouragement of  particular forms of organizations 
in civil society (museums, scientific institutions, non-profit organiza-
2 Nozick (1974) constitutes a notable exception to this general trend. However, 
his criticism differs greatly from mine. In fact, they exclude each other. This is so 
because my criticism of Rawls is based on an anti-egalitarian principle of distribu-
tion of social goods (the meritocratic principle) while Nozick’s entitlement theory 
explicitly rejects any such principles.
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tions, local associations, and so on). There are no a priori arguments 
in favor of a specific policy that can fulfill these goals independent-
ly of how our current society has managed to respond to other du-
ties and common concerns. As with many other topics of political 
philosophy, there is a gap between abstract moral judgement and 
the particular decisions of daily politics that only experience-related 
knowledge and practices can bridge.
I begin by giving an introductory characterization of the duty of 
gratitude and summarizing Rawls’ views on merit and the Natural 
Lottery argument, on which it relies. Then, in section 2, I argue that 
Rawls’ position fails by showing an internal contradiction in his con-
ception of moral responsibility. It is often believed that caring about 
merit unjustly undermines the position of the worse-off. I face this 
concern in section 3. In section 4 I discuss two relevant possible ob-
jections. One deals with the kind of intentions the benefactor must 
have when performing qua benefactor, the other with the asymmetry 
between rights and duties. I hope that by dealing with them I further 
clarify some fundamental aspects of my account of the role of grati-
tude in politics. Finally I present a brief conclusion that summarizes 
my line of reasoning.
I-The duty of gratitude and the arbitrariness of 
talents.
In what is now regarded as a classic in moral philosophy W.D. Ross 
presented a list of the types of duties moral agents have. He writes:
Some [duties] rest on previous acts of other men, i.e. services done 
by them to me. These may be loosely described as duties of gratitude. 
Some rest on the fact or possibility of a distribution of pleasure or 
happiness (or of the means thereto) which is not in accordance with 
the merit of the person concerned; in such cases there arises a duty to 
upset or prevent such a distribution. These are the duties of justice. 
Some rest on the fact that there are other beings in the world whose 
condition we can make batter in respect of virtue, or intelligence, or 
pleasure. These are the duties of beneficence. (Ross, 1930, p.21).
And later he adds:
…there are special obligations. These may arise, in the first place, in-
cidentally, from acts which were not essentially mean to create such 
an obligation, but nevertheless create it. From the nature of the case 
such acts may be of two kinds- the infliction of injuries on others, and 
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the acceptance of benefits from them. It seem clear that these put us 
under special obligations to other men, and that only these acts can 
do so incidentally. From these arise the twin duties of reparation and 
gratitude. (Ross, 1930 p.27).
Regardless of whether this characterization of our duties is right or 
not, it seems to capture three very relevant moral intuitions regar-
ding distributive justice. 1) That justice requires us to give to each 
one what he or she deserves, 2) that talented individuals who make 
valuable contributions to society require special recognition and 
reward, and 3) that if we are in a position that allows us to improve 
the quality of life of our fellow citizens in need,3 then we have reasons 
to do so.
Members of society are very different in talents and also make di-
fferent levels of effort. Some work very hard and produce very little, 
while others are so naturally skilled that they can make the greatest 
contributions to humankind easily. Of course a large majority of in-
dividuals are between these too extreme cases, not forgetting those 
who, because their initial circumstances (by having serious mental or 
physical disabilities), cannot make almost any contributions at all. It 
does not seem hard to see how an argument in favor of treating these 
people differently could arise from Ross’ duties of justice, gratitude 
and beneficence. It could be said: “Because of his valuable contribu-
tions, Mozart surely deserved at his time some kind of social recog-
nition in terms of honors and resources on which other people -for 
example an idle Viennese aristocrat- could not have a claim” and also 
“Because these people are starving, or because they are illiterate and 
have no possible access to education, we need to spend some of our 
resources on them”.
The first judgment is based on acknowledging a duty of gratitude 
to a particular person, while the second on one of beneficence.
Now, although almost all contemporary approaches to distributi-
ve justice accept that political communities have duties of improving 
the situation of the worse-off (pace libertarians), most of them reject 
any duties of gratitude. Many of them also oppose any characteriza-
tion of justice similar to the one sketched above, according to which 
3 Here I am addressing distributive justice in the domestic realm only. It is hard 
to see how an international principle of gratitude could be defended without admi-
tting first a domestic one. However, I will remain neutral on whether my argument 
also supports expanding the principle beyond state borders. 
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what people are and do is essential to determine what they deserve. 
This opposition is most of the times based on an egalitarian concern. 
Social equality is believed to be a significant political value that the 
principle of gratitude would easily override, for it requires us to make 
distinctions according to peoples’ merits, giving more to those who 
do better, and thus generating inequalities between the more-talen-
ted and the less-talented. It is also feared that this may specifically 
harm those who are already worse-off, as their situation makes very 
hard for them to make as relevant contributions to society as those 
who started better-off.
One of the most famous arguments against taking into account 
people’s talents when thinking about distributive justice is that given 
by Rawls (1971, p.70), which has become by far the most popular 
one. He affirms that the principles for the distribution of “primary 
goods” -those things that individuals have reasons to value because 
they are necessary for a decent life, whatever life project they may 
choose (Rawls, 1982) - should be distributed impartially. By this he 
means that we cannot choose any principles that could be reasonably 
rejected by those who could be benefited if other principles were cho-
sen. On these grounds principles such as “let us give more resources 
to the blond” would be unfair, for there are no reasonable grounds on 
which the non-blond could accept such discrimination. This seems 
almost trivial if justice is taken to be a relevant moral value all re-
asonable people can be expected to affirm. Doing otherwise would 
mean equalizing justice with arbitrariness, and therefore, with the 
mere imposition of rules by the powerful on the weak. No morally 
irrelevant considerations can ground justice. It is for this reason that 
features such as one’s place of birth, race, gender, or hair color can-
not be a source of distinction between individuals when distributing 
wealth and social positions. To this Rawls adds that the reason for 
which those who do not have these characteristics can reasonably 
reject them as differentiating considerations is that they are the pro-
duct of luck. Those who have them cannot give an argument of why 
they deserve to have these characteristics, and, thus, neither are they 
able to provide reasons for receiving more resources in virtue of ha-
ving them.
In the same line, more talented people cannot argue in favor of 
giving special weight to their contributions to society, as the results 
of their actions are determined by a range of features that go beyond 
their control. Social and natural conditions, such as being born smar-
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ter than average people or in a family in which science and art are 
valued and promoted, are not the result of the free actions by those 
who would be benefited by the principle of gratitude.
There is no more reason to permit a distribution of wealth and in-
come to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by his-
torical accident and social fortune. (…) The extent to which natural 
capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of so-
cial conditions and class attitudes (…) It is impossible in practice to 
secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly 
endowed, and therefore we need to adopt a principle which recogni-
zes this fact and which also mitigates the arbitrariness of the natural 
lottery itself. (Rawls, 1967, p.162)
According to the argument, from the fact that our actual performan-
ce in society is heavily conditioned by our initial social position and 
our innate biological capacities it follows that this cannot have any 
role in a theory of distributive justice. Individuals are not responsible 
for their talents, they have them only because of luck. Hence, as in 
the case of the blond, we cannot expect those less advantaged by our 
principle (those who make little or no valuable contributions) reaso-
nably to accept it, so it constitutes an arbitrary principle that cannot 
belong to the realm of justice.
Two important conclusions follow from this argument. The first 
one is that individuals cannot make a fair claim based on their own 
contributions to society: Arguments of the form “I deserve X as a ma-
tter of justice because I did Y” are not allowed.4 No individual can say 
to have special rights in virtue of the valuable profits derived from 
exercising her talents. Second, there is no such a thing as a moral 
right to private property, for owning property certainly involves ha-
ving special rights derived either from transfers (therefore, depen-
ding on the social lottery, as in inheritance) or acquisitions through 
the exercise of an activity that requires at least some minimal talents 
4 It is important to keep in mind that according to Rawls there is another sense 
in which these claims are allowed. Once the institutional and legal setting are esta-
blished according to the principles of justice, people can make these type of claims. 
But they are not grounded on relevant moral considerations as such, but on the 
instrumentalist account of meritocracy and property rights. They are legal rights, 
but their validity does not depend on their status as moral rights. They are not part 
of Rawl’s basic structure.  Same thing applies to utilitarian liberals like Bentham 
and Mill, since they also recognize these rights as long as they are the byproduct of 
a morally justified legal system. 
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(assigned by a combination of the natural and the social lotteries). 
If the argument stopped here Rawls would be committing himself 
to a radical form of egalitarianism, according to which all forms of 
inequalities that go beyond one’s control are politically unaccepta-
ble. This is precisely the view defended by G.A Cohen (2008) and the 
other so-called “luck-egalitarians”. His conclusions are, nevertheless, 
significantly moderated by efficiency related considerations; we can 
establish a capitalist economic order based on private property, free 
enterprise, and meritocratic principles if they all render in the be-
nefit of the worse-off. It would be mistaken, however, to believe that 
Rawls ends up affirming something similar to our initial (although, 
vague) understanding of the duty of gratitude. We may find oursel-
ves giving more resources to those who make the most valuable con-
tributions, but Rawls’ reasons for doing so have nothing to do with 
gratitude. They are mere incentives for increasing productivity in the 
benefit of the worse-off.
In this very particular aspect Rawls’ conception does not differ 
from that of liberal-minded utilitarians. It is a key idea of utilitaria-
nism since Bentham that no other reason can be given that justifies a 
particular scheme of distribution but its social convenience in terms 
of the expected maximization of socially valued outcomes. Rawls di-
sagrees with classical utilitarians on what these socially valued out-
comes are, but keeps the idea that the only justification for merito-
cratic principles is one based on their tendency to promote this goal. 
He shares with utilitarianism some sort of fictionalist understanding 
of our impulses to reward merit: It might be the case that we have a 
very strong tendency in favor of benefiting the meritorious –whether 
this has a social or psychobiological origin is irrelevant- but these 
“moral impulses” can only be justified in politics as long as they are 
proven to be effective strategies for the improvement of the wellbe-
ing of the community as a whole. Strictly speaking, we owe nothing 
to the meritorious; it just happens to be the case that there are inde-
pendent reasons that lead as to behave as if we did.
2- Are our merits really ours?
I have begun by presenting in a very general way what- following 
Ross- I have called duties of gratitude. Now, before facing Rawls’ ar-
gument, some clarifications regarding the concept of gratitude may 
be required.
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The first thing that needs to be said is that it entails a relation be-
tween two or more moral agents. No one can be said to have a duty of 
gratitude towards an umbrella, her childhood, or Madame Bovary, 
even if she was greatly benefited from them, and even if there might 
be a sense in which she is thankful for them being the way they are.5 
Neither can anyone have a duty of gratitude towards himself. It is 
true that many people reward themselves for carrying out unplea-
sant or tedious tasks, but whatever motivational force these strate-
gies may have they have nothing to do with gratitude as such. 
Second, the duty of gratitude arises only in the specific situations 
in which a person, or a set of them, performs consciously an action 
that is known to be valuable by those who are subjected to that duty. 
It is a necessary condition that the action is known to be valuable for 
at least two main reasons: 1) because no one can be compelled to be 
grateful for something whose existence he is not aware of (which, 
of course does not override his duty to acquire true beliefs about it) 
and 2) since he cannot properly have this duty unless the performed 
action is, and not merely thought to be, valuable6. 
Third, there must be a proportion between the value of the reward 
and the value of the action performed, a fact that was already pointed 
out by Aquinas (Summa Theologica, II–II, q. 104, art. 3).
Fourth, the obligation arises for all of those that are benefited by 
the valued action, if its value consists in benefiting anyone in parti-
cular; or to society as a whole, if it does not directly benefit anyone 
in particular but, nevertheless, it is valuable. Because of this last cha-
racteristic the duty of benevolence is not only ethical, but also politi-
cal, for it sometimes requires society as a whole to benefit someone 
through political institutions.
This definition does not pretend to be exhaustive, but only to point 
out what I believe are the essential characteristics of any understan-
ding of gratitude that, as in the case of Ross, aims to have a relevant 
role in our account of justice. Of course many questions are still un-
resolved here, but I believe this account should be enough for our 
5 Some philosophers have argued that we can have duties of gratitude towards 
institutions too, specially towards the State. See McAleer, 2012 and McConnell, 
1993.
6 We can already infer from this that it is not a mere contingent consequence of 
the Social Lottery that some contributions are better considered than others. Even 
Rawls has to accept this since “primary goods” have to be produced regardless of 
the “conceptions of the good” individual citizens have. 
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current concerns. In the following pages I will face some problems 
which, I hope, will help to provide a clearer picture of both the nature 
and the scope of the duties of gratitude.
Having said this, let us retake Rawls’ argument against claims ba-
sed on talents.
There is a key point to keep in mind: that according to Rawls, 
effort is somehow also determined by the natural and social lotteries, 
and therefore it is not deserved either. If this was not the case, the 
Meritocratic Principle that Rawls rejects could be still justified, for it 
would allow us to give rewards to those who, having a natural and so-
cial predisposition make the necessary effort to bring about valuable 
results, in opposition to those that keep their talents in potentia. The 
duty of gratitude as I have just defined it takes this distinction into 
account, for it takes as morally significant only the results of actions, 
not the mere capacity to carry them out.
Whether our talents are completely shaped by our natural and 
social initial conditions, and therefore, completely outside our con-
trol, is a difficult question to answer. There is little agreement among 
biologists, psychologists, and sociologists on to what extent biology 
and environment shape our skills in such a way that there is nothing 
we can intentionally do throughout life to improve them. The vast 
majority of them do support the commonsense view that there is so-
mething we can do about them. However, it is hard to see how Rawls 
could maintain his argument if self-improvement was less than 
impossible. For as long as there is a little room for responsibility it 
would have an impact for at least a limited understanding of the duty 
of gratitude. It seems quite counterintuitive that such a radical ac-
count can be right, for it is a common belief based both on experience 
and self-knowledge that people do, at least to some degree, have the 
capacity of improving their own skills outside their initial social and 
natural constrictions. Nevertheless, even if implausible, it would not 
be fair to reject Rawls’ argument just because it is based on a premise 
that is not shared by everyone. We do not have clear answers at this 
point. Thus we must choose a different strategy than doubting his 
strong psychological and metaphysical assumptions.
The alternative line of reasoning I would like to present here is one 
that is not based on a factual claim but on a moral argument. Because 
of the reasons stated above, I claim that Rawls cannot disregard the 
performance of individuals when thinking about distributive justice 
unless he takes an understanding of the person, according to which 
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neither his talents nor his efforts are, in any way, the result of a res-
ponsible choice. Now, the reason for which this account is relevant 
is that, as Rawls himself seems to acknowledge, it vanishes all moral 
responsibility regarding how much each of us is contributing to so-
ciety. If this is so, what differentiates the person who- according to 
Rawls- is treated unjustly because others are rewarded for their me-
rits and the criminal who is punished for breaking the law? It seems 
plausible to say that the attitudes and motivations that make many 
people commit a crime are both shaped by natural and social circum-
stances. However, at least when it comes to the social ones, almost 
no one seems to admit that they are strong enough for overriding 
moral responsibility. Rawls himself seems to support this view when 
writing about the moral justification of punishment:
… a particular man is punished, rather than some other man, because 
he is guilty, and he is guilty because he broke the law (past tense). In 
this case the law looks back, the judge looks back, the jury looks back, 
and the penalty is visited upon him for something he did. That a man 
is to be punished, and what is punishment is to be, is settled by its be-
ing shown that he broke the law and that the law assigns that penalty 
for the violation of it. [Emphasis added] (Rawls, 1955)
How could such institution be established if we did not admit that 
criminals are, at least partially, responsible for their actions? If whe-
ther one ends up being a murderer or not was determined by pure 
luck -because it is taken to be the unavoidable result of social and na-
tural conditions assigned randomly- no reasonable person under the 
veil of ignorance would choose the moral principles that inspire our 
current penal system. There would be no moral difference between 
being a criminal and having mental or physical disabilities.7 Of cour-
se, something would have to be done to handle crime, but anything 
based on the notions of guilt and punishment would be completely 
inappropriate. Fighting crime would no longer mean dealing with 
responsible human beings that consciously break the law and do 
wrong to others, but something closer to preventing natural disas-
7 There are some people who have taken this view. However, accepting that the-
re is no moral difference between the criminal and the mentally disturbed would 
banish all attempts of grounding political principles on the moral powers and 
equal dignity of citizens. For radical attempts of abolishing the moral dimension of 
crime see Menninger, 1972. 
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ters, calamities in which no responsibility or wrongdoing are invol-
ved.
It seems that even for Rawls reasonable people under the veil of 
ignorance would choose to establish a penal system because they 
must regard each other as free and equal moral agents. This means 
that they must assume that they are at least partially responsible for 
their actions regardless of the limitations they may have. Initial cir-
cumstances are constraints that shape individuals’ capacities and 
behavior, and some social policies aiming to reduce their impact 
may be justified, but they do not override moral responsibility. In 
the same way, if people are to be understood as autonomous moral 
agents, they must also be regarded as morally responsible for their 
good works. Why should people under the veil of ignorance accept 
that those who harm society in any relevant sense are to be punished, 
as responsible moral agents, but reject that those who do good to 
society to be rewarded as if their actions had nothing to do with their 
good will?
Someone could argue that while a penal system is a necessary con-
dition for maintaining a well-ordered society, a principle that assigns 
more resources to those who make more valuable contributions is 
not. We may have duties of gratitude as individuals, but they cannot 
take them as one of our political principles. But why not? If mem-
bers of a community know that certain things are valuable and en-
sure equal opportunities to everyone so they can contribute to their 
achievement, how could it be unjust for them to reward anyone who 
ends up making such contributions? Surely the principle of gratitude 
is impartial, for it does not benefit anyone a priori. It just affirms 
“when sharing the benefits of our common project of living together 
let us take into account who provided those things that are recogni-
zed as most valuable”. Formulated in this way it is a principle that 
people who are not benefited by it cannot reasonably reject.
The analogy with the penal system is relevant because it shows an 
inconsistency in Rawls’ moral reasoning. There is an unavoidable in-
ternal contradiction between understanding individuals as free and 
equal reasonable agents with moral powers and holding- as it follows 
from the Natural Lottery Argument- that they are not responsible be-
fore the community for their own actions, especially when these are 
rightly valued by fellow citizens. But according to Rawls’ theory of 
justice we must think of citizens as free an equal persons ruled by im-
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partial principles. And this is the sort of impartiality that we find in 
the Meritocratic Principle derived from collective duties of gratitude.
Rewarding valuable contributions is not like privileging males or 
blonde people, because it is not linked to what people are but to what 
they do. Of course our chances of bringing about a valuable contri-
butions is constrained by talents that are not in all cases the product 
of a process of self-improvement. But neither are criminal actions. If 
justice requires that we think of citizens as free and equal, then we 
must think of them as responsible too. Those who do not make va-
luable contributions do not have reasonable arguments for opposing 
the principle of gratitude. It is a principle that is shared in our daily 
moral life which can be formulated in an impartial way; it does not 
benefit anyone in particular regardless of their conscious behavior.
The price to pay for rejecting that we are responsible for our valua-
ble products is to stop conceiving ourselves as free and responsible 
subjects. Punishment is not like preventing natural disasters; there 
are responsible individuals involved. Benefactors are responsible for 
their actions too. Nevertheless, Rawls applies the Natural Lottery to 
them-but not to criminals-in order to treat their valuable outcomes 
as a communitarian product that gives no special status to their real 
producers. The concept of moral responsibility in politics has two si-
des: the possibility of harming the community and that of benefiting 
it. You cannot take one side of it and reject the other.
3-Merit, equality, and beneficence.
There are many considerations that can be inferred from the pre-
vious counterargument against Rawls’ position. The first one is that, 
as Rawls (1967, p.160) himself thought, we need to make a sharp 
distinction between the question of the moral relevance of merit and 
how to understand the principle of equality of opportunities. The se-
cond refers to the way in which different offices and social positions 
are to be distributed among individuals, and the policies that are de-
fensible for changing our current ways of doing so.
As I said before, one of the motives that leads many philosophers 
to disregard the importance of gratitude in politics is that it seems to 
justify huge inequalities among citizens, which are condemned for 
many different reasons. It could be argued that caring about merit 
would mean giving up the concern for equality of opportunities, sin-
ce it entails overriding the relevance of external factors in the name 
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of individual responsibility. This, however, is an unfair charge. The 
principle of gratitude is neutral regarding how people achieved the 
social position that helped them to make their contributions to socie-
ty. It only states that the fact that those individuals have brought va-
luable outcomes is a strong reason for beneficiaries rewarding them, 
which applies to private individuals, associations, or even the State, 
as the sovereign institutional framework for collective agency.
The principle of gratitude is not only compatible with the principle 
of equality of opportunities but it seems to support it against views 
that oppose any redistribution policies for initial circumstances, ei-
ther because they regard those inequalities in themselves to be just 
(like in the case of the traditionalist defense of aristocracy or any 
other form of natural hierarchies) or their reparation as morally un-
acceptable (libertarianism). The argument could have the following, 
yet oversimplified structure: It follows from the principle of gratitude 
that society must reward those who make valuable contributions, not 
because of their social position but because of what they do. Therefo-
re, what people do matters regardless of their initial circumstances. 
People who are born in bad circumstances have more difficulties in 
making valuable contributions. By assigning social positions regard-
less of people’s capacities we are minimizing the possible outcomes 
of valuable contributions. Thus, we need to avoid these forms of un-
fair discrimination so that talented people can maximize the total 
amount of valuable outcomes. This differs from the traditional liberal 
argument, since it focuses not on the first-person view of the perso-
nal fulfillment of the individual- with which it is compatible- but on 
the third-person view that takes the agent as one contributor to the 
common good of civil society. The argument does not give us enough 
information for setting a specific understanding of the principle of 
equal opportunities. However, it compels us to look for a principle 
of equal opportunities. The fear that caring about merit vanishes a 
reasonable concern for the redistribution of opportunities is simply 
unjustified.
There is another important consideration that is linked to the one 
above: that society in general, and public institutions in particular, 
should not be only concerned with equality and efficiency. According 
to the principle of gratitude, individuals can make valuable contri-
butions that generate special duties for other people which compel 
institutions to treat them differently. This is so because society is jus-
tified in trying to maximize valuable outcomes that do not necessari-
Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday   Personal Merit and the Politics of Gratitude
Τέλος,	Vol.	XXI/2	(39-62) 53
ly involve improving the conditions of the worse-off. The promotion 
of art, culture, and scientific knowledge are communitarian goals in 
which public institutions need to play a role. It would be silly to say 
that these things are valuable only as long as they improve the li-
ving conditions of the worse-off, for it seems clear that a possible 
world A in which these valuable things are greater is better than an 
alternative world B in which they are less, even if in both cases the 
living conditions of the worse-off remain the same. In the same way, 
it would constitute a tremendous monstrosity to sacrifice all these for 
insignificant gains in the living conditions of the worse-off. There are 
many achievements that leave a valuable legacy to the entire human-
kind that are independent from how they benefit the specific needs 
of the worse-off, and there is a degree in which it is right to prioritize 
these goals.
It would be wrong, however, to infer from here that the princi-
ple of gratitude has just an instrumental justification, establishing 
a mere system of incentives. This is the result of Rawls’ weakened 
meritocracy. We must oppose this view for two reasons. First, it is 
very doubtful that many of what we regard as the greatest contri-
butions of individuals to their communities and to humankind in 
general have directly increased the total amount of primary goods, 
and more precisely those for the worse-off. Newton’s Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy, Verdi’s operas, Russell and White-
head’s Principia Mathematica, or Cervantes’ Don Quixote are good 
examples. Second, when society rewards those who have contributed 
to its legacy it does not do it only in order to encourage them to keep 
working hard. If this was the case it would be extremely irrational to 
reward those people who, because of their age or other reasons, are 
not expected to contribute anymore. But it is not. We justly reward 
those individuals because the past valuable things they have done, 
not because of the things we expect them, or other people, to do in 
the future. In fact, we even reward through honors and memorials 
those who already passed away.
Probably one of the main reasons for which some philosophers 
reject the notion of gratitude as politically significant is that it seems 
to prioritize the wellbeing of those who are talented in opposition 
to the weaker, and therefore requiring us to spend resources on our 
meritorious elite instead of helping those who suffer the most. Of 
course it would be politically unacceptable that our public officers 
decided to give huge rewards to the talented when millions of people 
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remained incapable of meeting their most basic needs. It would be 
totally insane to prioritize paying huge sums to Nobel Prize winners 
while the vast majority of citizens are starving. But is this what the 
gratitude principle compels us to?
The answer is no. Two things need to be kept in mind for avoiding 
such an extreme conclusion. First, duties of gratitude require us to 
give proportional rewards (Card, 1988). By “proportional” I mean, 
not only that they have to be related to the value of the outcome, 
but also to the available welfare that society has in that particular 
moment. Secondly, the duty of gratitude is not the only duty that 
political institutions have towards the members of their community. 
Among many others, it has to be balanced with the duty of beneficen-
ce that was stated at the beginning. The fact that some people are li-
ving under unbearable conditions combined with the State’s capacity 
to relief them sets up a duty that can many times override duties of 
gratitude. My intention has not been to prove that rewarding merit is 
the only thing that matters, but that it is one of the many aspects that 
a theory of justice needs to take into account.
4- Two objections.
In the previous sections I have defended that public institutions and 
civil society should take merit into account when distributing goods 
and social positions so that benefactors are rewarded for the valuable 
contributions they have made. My argument relies on the analogy 
between interpersonal relations and relations between individuals 
in a political community in which public institutions- among other 
functions- have to articulate at least some of the moral demands and 
obligations that correspond to that society as a whole. However, the-
re are at least two possible arguments that seem to put this analogy 
into question. I hope that by discussing them I will provide a farther 
development of my views while making them at the same time more 
convincing.8
The intentionality argument: Previously, I have defended that the 
fact that someone consciously realized a valuable action for the com-
munity is a sufficient condition for a duty of gratitude to arise. This 
notion might seem ambiguous or not demanding enough. Most of us 
8 I want to thank Gerrald Verhoef for our fruitful discussions over these issues. 
Many of the following points were inspired by him. 
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think that it is not enough for having a duty of gratitude in interper-
sonal relations that someone does something aiming to benefit us. 
Sometimes it is hard to tell what really moves people to behave in a 
particular way. This is remarkably so when it comes to individuals 
acting in a complex social environment where no one in particular 
is benefited. Many times meritorious people make valuable contri-
butions for reasons that have nothing to do with intentionally be-
nefiting anyone. And even when they do it is almost impossible for 
public institutions to know when this is the case. So, according to this 
argument, my view entails at least two problems: 1) it has an ambi-
guous and not demanding enough conception of the intentions of the 
benefactor, and 2) it generates an unsolvable epistemic problem for 
public institutions.
Some of the points of this argument rely on a misunderstanding 
of the duty of gratitude in a way that applies both to interpersonal 
relations and to the political realm. First of all, it is very doubtful that 
you should only be grateful in those cases in which the action that 
benefited you was combined with the intention of doing so. Think 
for instance in the following case: A person is at the beach and sees 
a drowning child, he gets into the ocean, and rescues him. Now, the 
parents of the child should be grateful to the person that saved the 
child, even if they know that the person that saved the child did not 
have the intention to benefit them in particular. Actually, he might 
have not thought about the child’s parents at all. This, however, has 
no relevance when it comes to deciding whether the parents of the 
child should or should not be grateful. Probably, the person who 
saved the child was motivated by the thought that the child was in 
danger, not that he could benefit Jesús and María, or any relatives of 
the child, by keeping him alive.
The claim that the duty of gratitude requires that our benefactor 
has the intention of benefiting us is appealing because it avoids sce-
narios in which intuitively no duties of gratitude seem to arise (Sim-
mons, 1979); cases in which by a matter of luck someone ends up 
benefiting us. A “matter of luck” is a quite ambiguous expression in 
this context, since there is a sense according to which it was a “matter 
of luck” that Jesús and María were benefited by the man at the beach; 
if the child had happened to be someone else’s, then they would not 
have been benefited. There seems to be a morally significant diffe-
rence between this case and others in which a person performs an 
action that benefits others without having the intention. I believe 
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that the crucial distinction here is the following: For someone to be 
a benefactor he does not have to know who he will benefit. However, 
they are two necessary conditions he must meet:  that he knows that 
his action is valuable and that he takes this fact as one of his fun-
damental reasons for doing it. So, the parents of the child must be 
grateful to the man at the beach, not because he had the intention 
of benefiting them, but because he did something that was good and 
beneficial for others, because he thought preventing the child’s death 
was the right thing to do. 
This could lead us to say that the relevant aspect for communi-
tarian duties of gratitude is that the benefactor behaves moved by 
“altruistic considerations” which do not point to anyone in particu-
lar. Here we need to keep in mind that acting for reasons that do not 
maximize selfish desires is not the same thing as acting motivated 
by a concern for the wellbeing of others, however distant and abs-
tractly we can think of them. If this is so, if you are motivated to do 
something that is valuable for society because you believe it to be va-
luable, then you are acting for “altruistic reasons”, which can ground 
duties of gratitude. Take Dostoyevski as an example. Someone could 
argue that no one – including the Russian people- owed him grati-
tude because he had economic considerations and his own pleasure 
as the main reasons for him to write. But this way of describing the 
facts is misleading, as one of the strongest motives that Dostoyevski 
had- and this applies to most cases in which people make significant 
valuable contributions- was simply that he thought he was making 
valuable literary works (not only aesthetically, but also moral and 
religiously), on which he was right. Thus, his works made him a be-
nefactor of society even if it was true -which is very implausible- that 
he never thought about benefiting anyone when writing. His reasons 
for performing the activity were the same for which we consider him 
a great benefactor to humankind: the immense value of his contribu-
tions to literature.
But what about the epistemic dimension of the problem? I think 
this is of much less importance than what it may look like at first 
view. Most of the times public officials and civil society in general do 
have enough information to judge whether a benefactor was acting 
consciously and for the same reasons that make society grateful to 
him. Actually, in the vast majority of cases, this is the most plausi-
ble explanation, and thus, it should be the default one. It would be 
unreasonable to ask a war hero for evidences in favor of the claim 
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that he was acting for the right reasons when he saved the lives of 
his compatriots. The burden of proof relies on the other side, and it 
entails no further difficulties than finding any other socially relevant 
piece of information, since nothing but facts about his behavior and 
environment could be provided for building a case against him. We 
know that Dostoyevski wrote for the right reasons because nothing 
justifies a reasonable alternative explanation of his behavior.
The essence argument: If someone is meritorious when he does 
something beneficial to others for the right reasons, then it looks like 
he cannot do it because he expects a reward. If this is so, the person 
benefited cannot have the duty to reward his benefactor, although 
it would be better if he did it, since it would be a sign of a virtuous 
character (Wellman, 1999, p.292). In this sense, being grateful is not 
mandatory but superogatory. The benefactor cannot have a claim 
against the beneficiary. It goes against the very nature of gratitude to 
turn into a source of rights for the benefactor. This fact, important as 
it is in interpersonal relations, becomes even more relevant in the po-
litical domain, where citizens’ rights and duties are to be established. 
No one can demand in contemporary democratic societies either for 
his community to be virtuous in this way, nor to be rewarded by State 
policies because of it. Gratitude is a moral concept of such a kind that 
it cannot establish claims of justice, as it does not determine manda-
tory actions. It is beyond justice and, therefore, exceeds the limits of 
legitimate State’s intervention in the moral life of its citizens.
There are several mistakes in this view. First of all, it wrongly in-
fers from my claim that sometimes the State has to reward bene-
factors of the community that the State has a duty of gratitude. It 
does not. Sometimes the State has to reward particular individuals 
because society as a whole has a duty of gratitude. It is not the State 
who must show a virtuous character by rewarding benefactors, but 
society. Public institutions are just a means of the community for ex-
pressing the gratitude of the community. Therefore, even though the 
benefactor might not rightly demand anyone to be virtuous, the State 
still has strong reasons to benefit her. From this confusion between 
what individuals can legitimately claim and what the State must do it 
also follows that, since individuals sometimes have the superogatory 
duty of expressing gratitude then giving rewards must be superoga-
tory for the State too. It would be mistaken to assume then that adop-
ting these policies is just optional, since there are no such things as 
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supererogatory duties when it comes to choosing among alternative 
public policies.
Moreover, even if it was showed that it was wrong for the benefac-
tor to complain (Weiss, 1985) it would not imply that there were no 
decisive reasons for the State to reward her. It could still constitute 
cases of ingratitude that any impartial spectator would criticize (Ber-
ger, 1975). It might be the case for the benefactor not to be in a moral 
position that allowed her to make such complain and still be the best 
course of action for the State. Here we find a sort of moral asymme-
try between the meritorious and the State. From the viewpoint of the 
meritorious, she might not have the right to be rewarded. However, 
society should be grateful to her, which compels public institutions 
in a mandatory way. In other words, sometimes it is possible for the 
State to do wrong without violating anyone’s rights. 9 
There are some historical remarks that explain why this view is 
not popular among political philosophers. For the last decades the-
re has been a strong tendency in political philosophy in favor of ta-
king for granted two very implausible assumptions: that the moral 
requirements that should guide politics only deal with justice and 
that justice can be understood solely in terms of rights. This is pre-
cisely what leads some to believe that since gratitude does not give 
anyone the right to have a claim of justice- we are committing no 
injustice by not rewarding her- then gratitude cannot play any role 
in shaping our public institutions and policies. It is because both of 
them take these two ideas for granted that G.A Cohen is able to de-
fend luck-egalitarianism against Rawls’ instrumental meritocracy. 
Cohen argues that talented people should not expect any incentives 
if it is the case that they truly care for social justice (2008, pp.181-
223; 2009). I agree with him that virtuous benefactors should not 
stop contributing if incentives were taken away from them. However, 
it does not follow from this that the State should not reward them. 
As Raz (1986, p.199) has showed with his account of public goods, 
public institutions many times have very strong reasons to promote 
9  The fact that the gratitude-based account of meritocracy does not requires 
duties/rights symmetry is a clear advantage over desert-based accounts such as 
Sandel’s (2009) or Miller’s (1989), since it avoids an important Rawlsian objection 
without ad hoc strategies while it remains loyal to our intuitions about the moral 
significance of rewarding merit . Of course one could still defend that the bene-
factor has a right to be rewarded, but this polemical point is not required by the 
gratitude-based account.  
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certain social goals to which no individual can have a claim of justice. 
I do not want to discuss here what scope we should give to justice, 
whether it entails a right to complain, and if this is one of those cases. 
My point is that you may think that the benefactor does not have the 
right to be rewarded and still believe that it is wrong for the State not 
to do it in a particular case.
Nevertheless, it would be still possible to argue that I have not 
shown yet why society should reward people like Dostoyevski –ge-
nerating social inequalities- just because we rightly feel grateful for 
what he did. Remember, I am not claiming for a radical principle of 
meritocracy that overrides all other considerations, I am just defen-
ding that under some circumstances we should take merits into ac-
count when distributing what Rawls (1982) called “primary goods”. 
The only way I can answer to the question of why we should some-
times distribute resources in such a way that it benefits those that 
make valuable contributions is by affirming that we normally agree 
that doing good to the community grounds sometimes a better treat-
ment by the collective. That all of us think that it is wrong to ignore 
the fact that someone prepared dinner for us when deciding who will 
get the last share; or to name a public building after the brother-in-
law of the major, instead of honoring someone that truly deserves it. 
These are cases of ingratitude that are morally blameworthy. They 
are conclusions that derive from taking citizens as free and respon-
sible moral agents who can contribute to the common good of civil 
society.
But why primary goods? Is not being thankful good enough? No, 
since there are cases in which the contribution is so significant that 
the only way for the benefited to express their gratitude properly is to 
offer a benefit back to the benefactor (Swinburne, 1989 and Berger, 
1975). Sometimes public institutions have decisive reasons to give 
primary goods because this is what a proper expression of gratitude 
in the name of society requires.
It is important to remark that the non-monetary compensations 
by which we many times thank the benefactors of our communities 
constitutes in themselves important “primary goods”. Non-mone-
tary compensations bring prestige and fame, which constitute valua-
ble social resources.  In the same way, income distribution is strongly 
linked to social recognition (Honneth, 1995, p.127). There is no pos-
sible sharp cut between the public sphere and the private one when it 
comes to a community being thankful to some of its members. These 
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are all valuable goods whose unequal distribution generate socioeco-
nomic differences. 
Conclusion
I have argued in favor of taking gratitude as a relevant dimension 
of distributive justice. I have defined gratitude as a special duty that 
arises whenever someone consciously produces a valuable outcome 
which requires a proportional reward. This duty is not just private in 
nature, it does not arise only between individuals. It is also public, 
for it may apply to the community as a whole. It requires that public 
institutions and civil society are of such a kind that they are able to 
canalize and express gratitude through honors, monetary rewards, 
and other distinctions. Merit and gratitude are important moral con-
cepts for shaping collective agency.
Facing Rawls’ objection to the intrinsic value of meritocracy (the 
Natural Lottery Argument) I have replied that meritocratic princi-
ples are not unjust, for they are the reasonable outcomes of taking 
citizens as autonomous individuals that are responsible for their ac-
tions, even if they are influenced by factors that go beyond their free 
choices. Actually, the relevance of gratitude is derived from taking 
seriously the moral freedom of citizens. This does not oppose the 
principle of equality of opportunities. I have also given arguments in 
favor of regarding gratitude not solely as an instrumental device (a 
system of incentives), but as a prima facie duty derived from the so-
cial value of performed contributions, that can, nevertheless, be ove-
rridden in particular circumstances in which other duties of justice 
arise. Thus, caring about rewarding merit does not put into question 
granting a sufficiency level for all who cannot help themselves.
Duties of gratitude only arise when benefactors have the right mo-
tivations. That is, when they consciously carry out the action, and 
when they do it for the right reasons. There must be at least a par-
tial overlap between the reasons that move the benefactor and the 
considerations that make his action valuable. Nevertheless, there 
is nothing philosophically puzzling about finding out when people 
meet this criterion. Finally, I have questioned the sharp dichotomy 
between different types of rewards. All of them imply social recogni-
tion and means for developing one’s life projects that generate social 
inequalities. There is no a priori argument based on the moral con-
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cept of gratitude that forbids any particular kind of reward. Instead, 
it depends on the particular circumstances.
There are many issues I would have liked to discuss here that I 
had to leave aside. However, I hope that this may constitute a step 
towards recognizing the importance of rewarding merit in our con-
temporary democratic societies. Sometimes it is just wrong to treat 
people equally when they are contributing unequally to our common 
goals.
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